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WHY CHINA HAD TO “BAN” 
CRYPTOCURRENCY BUT THE U.S. 
DID NOT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
REGULATIONS ON CRYPTO-MARKETS 
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA 
INTRODUCTION 
The cryptocurrency market grew from a $1.5 billion market 
capitalization in early 2013 to over $795 billion in January 2018.1 Bitcoin, 
an exemplar cryptocurrency, gained value from $0.08 before 2010 to over 
$17,000 per bitcoin in December 2017.2 While cryptocurrencies have 
campaigned for revolutionizing financial transactions, the crypto-market is 
plagued by nefarious minds, fleecing investors in frauds and Ponzi 
schemes.3 This crypto-mania therefore presents numerous legal and 
regulatory challenges that demand prompt and efficient responses. 
Nevertheless, the decentralized, anonymous nature of cryptocurrencies 
magnifies these challenges and has constantly outpaced the law’s ability to 
respond. To understand the effects of different regulatory strategies, this 
Note compares regulatory landscapes on cryptocurrency between the U.S. 
and China.  
In a nutshell, while China explicitly banned any exchange or financing 
activities between fiat money and “coin substitution” in 2017, the U.S. has 
placed cryptocurrencies within its existing legal labyrinth. What explains 
the difference and what is its result? Rather than reducing the regulatory 
                                                          
1  Global Charts – Total Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018).  
2  Blu Putnam & Erik Norland, Bitcoin and Gold: A Growth Comparison, OPEN MARKETS (Nov. 
27, 2017), http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/12749/bitcoin-gold-growth-comparison; Stan Higgins, 
From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited, COINDESK (Dec. 29, 2017), 
https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revisited/.      
3  Ted Knutson, Cryptocurrency Fraud Widespread, Warns Regulator, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/04/10/cryptocurrency-fraud-widespread-warns-
regulator/#6b59a3cc6b06; see also infra notes 41-47. 
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variances simply to differences in political ideologies,4 this Note attempts 
to explain the reasons behind the two countries’ drastically different 
regulatory approaches by understanding the regulators’ institutional 
capacities and objectives. This Note also identifies the interesting impacts 
of the two countries’ regulatory approach. Namely, China has attempted to 
substitute the crypto-market with state-led projects and even potential 
crypto-fiats, while the U.S. regulatory framework has maintained its 
consistency, but left some areas lawless while others potentially over-
regulated.  
Part I of this Note introduces the background of cryptocurrency and its 
technological strengths and weaknesses. Part II surveys the existing 
regulatory landscapes of the U.S. and China. Part III explains the reasons 
why the two countries take drastically different approaches in regulating 
cryptocurrency. Part IV lists comparative strengths and weaknesses 
between the two regulatory frameworks. Part V concludes and cautiously 
makes policy recommendations.  
I.  BACKGROUND OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AND CRYPTO-MANIA 
 A. Emergence of Cryptocurrency 
Cryptocurrency is a form of digital or virtual currency that uses 
cryptography to secure and verify transactions.5 Created in 2008, bitcoin is 
the world’s first decentralized cryptocurrency.6 The term bitcoin 
encompasses both the bitcoin virtual currency and the payment system, the 
                                                          
4  See, e.g., Michael J. Casey, It’s Political: Why China Hates Bitcoin and Loves the Blockchain, 
COINDESK (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/political-china-hates-bitcoin-loves-blockchain/; 
cf. generally THE ECONOMIST, China Invents the Digital Totalitarian State (Dec. 17, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21711902-worrying-implications-its-social-credit-project-
china-invents-digital-totalitarian. It is also rather obvious that the U.S has a market-centered political 
economy, with a tradition of honoring individualism and minimal state intervention, but China has a 
more state-centered political economy due to its socialist ideology and communitarian tradition.  
5  Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp 
(last updated Dec. 10, 2018). 
6  See CARL MULLAN, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLENGE: SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS THROUGH US FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 93-96 (2014), 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137382559_14; L.S., Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, THE 
ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2015/11/economist-explains-1; Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash 
System (White Paper), http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
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latter operating as a peer-to-peer transactional network that does not rely on 
any central government authority or established financial institution.7  
One of the purposes of the bitcoin payment system is to overcome the 
trust-based model of conventional online transactions, which relies on 
financial institutions to process payments.8 Satoshi Nakamoto, an alias of 
the unknown inventor of bitcoin, argues that the existing model requires a 
heightened yet unnecessary need of trust, but also tolerates a certain level 
of fraud.9 Additionally, third parties are often unable to avoid disputes on 
finality in each payment, increasing transaction costs.10 In light of these 
problems, Nakamoto proposes a more effective system, technologically 
making payment reversal impossible and eliminating the need for third 
parties.11    
To eliminate such a need, the bitcoin payment system develops two 
processes: mining and blockchain.12 Mining is the process by which 
transactions are verified and added to a public ledger.13 This public ledger, 
                                                          
7  Sarah J. Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating 
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. REG. 495, 504 (2015); Danielle Drainville, An 
Analysis of the Bitcoin Electronic Cash System (Dec. 21, 2012), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f7e3/3271bc73b1ae8501aa3776f9fb72695edffe.pdf. 
8  Nakamoto, supra note 6. 
9  Id. at 1. Satoshi Nakamoto’s true identity is still a mystery. According to Nakamoto, existing 
internet commerce “rel[ies] almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties 
to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it 
[systematically] suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust-based model.” Id. Because transactions 
are reversible, “financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases 
transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small 
casual transactions[.]” Id. Additionally, “[w]ith the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. 
Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would 
otherwise need.” Id. The existing transaction system accepts that a certain percentage of fraud is 
unavoidable. While “costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical 
currency. . . no [virtual] mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without a 
trusted party.” Id. However, Bitrated, a company that provides blockchain payment platform, has 
claimed success in making cryptocurrency transactions reversible. See BITRATED, 
https://www.bitrated.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). Also, irreversibility is a double-edged sword. For 
instance, the bitcoin protocol provides no correction mechanism for a payer to reverse an accidental or 
unwanted purchase, whereas other payment platforms, such as credit cards, do include such procedures. 
Adhil Shetty, Driven by Demonetisation, Bitcoin Hits $1,000: Should Indians Buy It?, FINANCIAL 
EXPRESS (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.financialexpress.com/money/driven-by-demonetisation-bitcoin-
hits-1000-should-indians-buy-it/510084/ (last updated Jan. 16, 2017). 
10  Nakamoto, supra note 6. 
11  Id.  
12  How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works.  
13  Id. 
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also known as a blockchain, chronologically records every transaction in 
the system and serves as the foundation of the bitcoin verification system.14 
Each blockchain is encrypted and logs information into smaller datasets 
referred to as “blocks.”15 Each block contains information about certain 
transactions, a reference to a preceding block, as well as a verification 
process that employs mathematical puzzles, also known as proof of work, 
to validate the information stored with the block.16 A new block of data will 
be added to the end of the blockchain only after computers in the same 
network reach a consensus,17 but incompatible blocks will be rejected.18 
Since every transaction is encrypted and verified, blockchain 
technologically makes transaction reversal impossible and third-party 
verification unnecessary.19  
The decentralized nature of bitcoin blockchain allows volunteers and 
engineers (often referred to as the blockchain ecosystem) to modify the 
blockchain network through “informal processes that depend on rough 
notions of consensus and that are subject to no fixed legal or organizational 
structure.”20  
                                                          
14  Id. 
15  Antony Lewis, A Gentle Introduction to Blockchain Technology 4 (Oct. 11, 2017) (Brave New 
Coin Gentle Introduction Reference Papers Series paper), https://j2-capital.com/gentle-introduction-
blockchain-technology. See also Block chain, BITCOIN FOUNDATION WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (noting that a “block chain is a 
transaction database shared by all nodes” on a network). 
16  See Joseph Bonneau et al., SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and 
Cryptocurrencies, 2015 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY, 3-4, 
www.jbonneau.com/doc/BMCNKF15-IEEESP-bitcoin.pdf. The “core ingredient” of the Nakamoto 
consensus that supports the bitcoin blockchain is the use of “use of a challenging computational puzzle 
to determine which party’s block will be considered the next block in the chain.” However, the bitcoin’s 
mining puzzle is not a true proof-of-work scheme but “a probabilistic one.” This means that while 
finding a solution is computationally challenging, “it is possible to get lucky and find a solution with 
very little work.” Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the 
Rise of Lex Cryptographia 7 (Mar. 10, 2015) (SSRN Article), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580664.  
17  Lewis, supra note 15, at 13, 15.  
18  Id. 
19   Id. 
20 Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257, 259 (2014). Theoretically, initial bitcoin blockchain not only establishes 
physical codes that provide a payment platform with a self-enforcing constraint on the supply of the 
amount of bitcoins, but also creates a structure that incentivizes the mining community to refine the 
ecosystem. See Bitcoin Developer Guide, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#proof-of-
work (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  
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Meanwhile, bitcoin also functions as a virtual currency, serving as a 
“medium of exchange existing entirely in intangible form that is not legal 
tender, but which can substitute for legal tender.”21 It is an “internet-based 
virtual currency in which the ownership of a particular unit of value is 
validated using cryptography.”22 Mining functions both as a transaction 
system and the means through which bitcoin is released.23 The process 
essentially involves resolving complex mathematical puzzles and intense 
coding, which create additional blocks in the blockchain to facilitate further 
transaction.24 Bitcoin’s value as a virtual currency derives precisely from 
the creation of this alternative yet useful form of money.25 Upon the initial 
“release” of bitcoin, “miners” were incentivized to solve the mathematical 
puzzles by rewarding them a certain amount of bitcoins.26 The cap was set 
at 21 million bitcoins.27  
Inspired by the bitcoin-blockchain technology, over 1,900 other 
cryptocurrencies or crypto-based tokens have emerged with different 
functions.28 For instance, Ethereum issued its cryptocurrency, ether, to 
operate a decentralized software platform and offer developers smart 
                                                          
21  Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 7, at 504. Generally, bitcoin can be obtained in three ways: 
(1) in exchange for conventional money in person or on an online exchange, (2) “in exchange for the 
sale of goods or services,” and (3) through mining. CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 1, 2 (July 15, 2014). 
22  Id.  
23  Supra note 12.  
24  Jan Reess-Alaric, Making Sense of Bitcoin -Part 1, FINEXTRA: BLOGS (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.finextra.com/community/fullblog.aspx?blogid=8039. See also Ken Tindell, Geeks Love the 
Bitcoin Phenomenon Like They Loved the Internet in 1995, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bitcoins-are-mined-and-used-2013-4. The actual mining of 
Bitcoins is a purely mathematical process.  
A useful analogy is with the search for prime numbers: it used to be fairly easy to find the small 
ones (Eratosthenes in Ancient Greece produced the first algorithm for finding them). But as 
they were found it got harder to find the larger ones. Nowadays researchers use advanced high-
performance computers to find them and their achievements are noted by the mathematical 
community (for example, the University of Tennessee maintains a list of the highest 5,000). 
Id. 
25  Why Do People Trust Bitcoin?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#why-do-people-trust-
bitcoin (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
26  Reess-Alaric, supra note 24.  
27  Nicholas A. Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of 
the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377, 387 (2013). 
28  All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2018). 
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contracts to issue their own tokens.29 Ripple issued XRP to facilitate 
exchanges among cryptocurrencies and fiat money.30 However, unlike 
bitcoin or Ethereum, the Ripple network is not decentralized. Rather than 
open the network to the public, it runs a permissioned blockchain network 
that predetermines its transaction validators.31 
Crypto-based tokens, in contrast, usually represent ownership of an 
asset, and by employing existing blockchain technology and smart contracts 
(often powered by the ERC standardized smart contract based on the 
Ethereum network),32 a company might forgo a traditional initial public 
offering (“IPO”), and instead issue shares and voting rights over the 
blockchain through initial coin offerings (“ICOs”).33 Rather than providing 
ownership interest, other ICO projects issue the so-called utility tokens or 
app coins, providing users with future access to the blockchain product or 
service, usually at a fraction of the finished product’s sticker price.34 As the 
crypto-mania has spread worldwide, capital raised through ICOs increased 
                                                          
29 Ether is used in Ethereum, a decentralized software platform that enables Smart Contracts and 
Distributed Applications to be built and run without any downtime, fraud, control or interference from 
a third party. See ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
30  “XRP, acts as a bridge currency to other currencies” on Ripple, “an open source and peer-to-
peer decentralized platform that allows for a seamless transfer of money in any form, whether USD, 
Yen, litecoin, or bitcoin.” Ripple “does not discriminate between one fiat/crypto currency and another, 
and thus, makes it easy for any currency to be exchanged for another.” Ripple (Cryptocurrency), 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ripple-cryptocurrency.asp (last updated June 26, 
2017).   
31  Nolan Bauerle, What Is the Difference between Public and Permissioned Blockchains?, 
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-the-difference-between-open-and-
permissioned-blockchains/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).  
32  Unlike traditional contracts, a smart contract is not written, but programmed. “All of the rules 
and regulations pertaining to the contract are programmed, meaning that the software will execute each 
and every action that is specified in the contract. This eliminates the possibility of miscommunication 
or misinterpretation.” Cryptocurrencies and Smart Contracts: What Are They?, STRATEGIC COIN, 
http://strategiccoin.com/cryptocurrencies-smart-contracts/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). See also ERC20 
Token Standard, THE ETHEREUM WIKI, 
https://theethereum.wiki/w/index.php/ERC20_Token_Standard.  
33  Josial Wilmoth, 3 Types of ICO Tokens, STRATEGIC COIN, http://strategiccoin.com/3-types-
ico-tokens/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). “For example, Filecoin–which raised an ICO-record $257 
million–plans to provide a decentralized cloud storage service that will take advantage of unused 
computer hard drive space. ICO contributors received tokens that they will be able to use to purchase 
storage space from Filecoin once the service has launched.” 
34  Id. 
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from approximately $95 million in 2016 to over $3.8 billion in 2017, and 
continued to escalate to over $18 billion until September 2018.35  
 B. Technological Strengths and Weaknesses of Cryptocurrency 
1. As a Payment Platform  
Because no intermediary is involved, cryptocurrency transactions are 
theoretically cheaper and faster than traditional payment networks. At least 
theoretically, the elimination of third-party intermediaries allows small 
businesses to gain access to capital, protect individuals against capital 
control and censorship, and encourage innovation.36 For instance, 
cryptocurrency can eliminate a variety of authorization fees, transactions, 
and customer service fees that have burdened small businesses under the 
current credit card system.37 Cryptocurrency also facilitates cross-border 
transactions.38 In 2014, immigrants in developed countries sent at least $427 
billion in remittances back to relatives living in developing countries.39 
While the global average fee for sending remittances was 7.37%, bitcoin 
payment system charges only 0.005 bitcoin or 1% of the transaction.40  
On the other hand, the decentralized nature of the cryptocurrency 
payment system presents opportunities for crime and fraud.41 The 
                                                          
35 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2016, COINSCHEDULE, 
https://www.coinschedule.com/stats.html?year=2016 (last accessed Sept. 15, 2018); Cryptocurrency 
ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats.html?year=2017 (last accessed 
Sept. 15, 2018). 
36  JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 13, (2d ed. 
2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/bitcoin-primer-policymakers.   
37  Bitcoin: Examining the Benefits and Risks for Small Business: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Business, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (statements of Jerry Brito, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus 
Center, George Mason University). 
38  Tom Simonite, Bitcoin Hits the Big Time, to the Regret of Some Early Boosters, MIT TECH. 
REV. (May 22, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/515061/bitcoin-hits-the-big-time-to-
the-regret-of-some-early-boosters/. The Founders Fund, the venture capital fund led by Peter Thiel, 
initial investor of PayPal and Facebook, has invested $3 million in the payment-processing company 
BitPay because of Bitcoin’s ability to lower cross-border online transactions. 
39  BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 36, at 16.  
40  Id. at 17. 
41  See, e.g., FBI DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE 
FEATURES PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY (2012) [hereinafter FBI 
INTELLIGENCE REPORT], https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf; 
Ari Juels et al., The Ring of Gyges: Investigating the Future of Criminal Smart Contracts, 23 ACM 
CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 283 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978362.  
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pseudonymous nature of cryptocurrency can be abused for money 
laundering and transactions of illicit goods and services.42 Although 
substantive evidence is lacking, the anonymity of cryptocurrency 
transactions “allows” criminals to discreetly move ill-gotten money.43 
Additionally, online black markets such as the infamous Deep Web and Silk 
Road have already taken advantage of the pseudonymous nature of bitcoin, 
where buyers can use bitcoin to purchase illicit drugs online in the same 
way that cash has been traditionally used for illicit purchases in person.44  
In China, the explosion of cryptocurrency trading was accompanied by 
fraud, theft, and scams.45 Around the same time as the police shutdown of 
Silk Road, Global Bond Limited, a Chinese bitcoin trading platform, 
suddenly closed its transaction platform, vanishing with about $5 million 
worth of bitcoin.46 Due to the decentralized nature of the transaction 
platform, Chinese law enforcement was often confused about what exactly 
was “stolen.”47  
2. As a Virtual Currency 
As a virtual currency, cryptocurrency offers a functional alternative to 
state-issued fiat money.48 Cryptocurrencies, especially bitcoin, can 
allegedly provide the most value to failing monetary regimes where 
residents are losing confidence in the value of their central bank.49 Unlike 
                                                          
42  FBI INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 41.  
43  BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 36, at 39.  
44  See Benjamin Weiser, Man behind Silk Road Website Is Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2yk3z9M; Grace Caffyn, Bitcoin on the Dark Web: The Facts, COINDESK 
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-on-the-dark-web-the-facts/. 
45  See Kadhim Shubber, $4.1 Million Goes Missing as Chinese Bitcoin Trading Platform GBL 
Vanishes, COINDESK (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.coindesk.com/4-1m-goes-missing-chinese-bitcoin-
trading-platform-gbl-vanishes/. 
46  Id.  
47  Bite Bi: Yi Changchetouchewei de Pang Shi Pianju (比特币：一场彻头彻尾的庞氏骗局), 
TAKUNGPAO (大公报) (Dec. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Bitcoin: An Absolute Ponzi Scheme], 
http://finance.takungpao.com/tech/q/2013/1204/2083491.html (This article, Bitcoin: An Absolute Ponzi 
Scheme, describes the bitcoin phenomenon as a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, and potentially a conspiracy 
led by the U.S.). 
48  See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 36, at 19-20. 
49  Id. Interestingly, while China’s central bank considered developing its state-owned 
cryptocurrency, Deloitte Consulting Group made similar suggestions that the U.S. should consider a 
state-sponsored cryptocurrency to overcome risks associated with completely decentralized 
cryptocurrency. LINDA PAWCZUK, DELOITTE, STATE-SPONSORED CRYPTOCURRENCY: ADAPTING THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/9
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state issued currencies, cryptocurrency appears to have “no political master 
to serve.”50 Transactional cryptocurrency allows citizens to have an option 
of exchange in countries where domestic currency only derives its value 
from its redeemability at a fixed rate for U.S. dollars.51 For instance, during 
the Argentinian Peso crisis, bitcoin entrepreneurs offered individuals and 
businesses the ability to circumnavigate the country’s currency regulations 
by using bitcoin exchanges and services.52       
Individuals in oppressive monetary regimes can also benefit from the 
financial privacy that cryptocurrency offers.53 Experiences with despotic 
governments suggest that citizens in oppressed regime might benefit from 
the ability to make private transactions free from confiscation or 
censorship.54 Cryptocurrency also can provide additional benefits of digital 
transfer to traditional cash transactions.55Additionally, as a medium of 
exchange, bitcoin excels at addressing the “double-spending” problem, 
thereby preventing counterfeiting.56 Blockchain makes it computationally 
impossible to use the same “currency” twice as it develops a chronological 
record of each irreversible transaction.57   
                                                          
BEST OF BITCOIN’S INNOVATION TO THE PAYMENTS ECOSYSTEM (2015), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/consulting/articles/state-sponsored-cryptocurrency-adpating-
bitcoin-innovation.html.  
50  John O. McGinnis & Kyle Roche, Bitcoin: Order Without Law in the Digital Age 
(Northwestern Pub. Law Research Paper No. 17-06, 2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929133; cf. 
Bitcoin: An Absolute Ponzi Scheme, supra note 47. Some Chinese analysts argued that bitcoin was a 
U.S. government-led conspiracy, evidenced by the fact that FBI held 144,000 bitcoins as one of the top 
bitcoin holders. See id. Additionally, because the measurement of bitcoin is usually in dollars, the 
popularity of bitcoin would enhance the superiority of USD just as the petrodollar system. However, 
while rejecting bitcoin as an independent currency, the PBoC proposed to launch its state-centralized 
cryptocurrency following the crackdown of crypto market transactions. Wolfie Zhao, PBoC Digital 
Currency Director Calls for Centralized State Cryptocurrency, COINDESK (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.coindesk.com/pboc-digital-currency-director-calls-centralized-state-cryptocurrency/. 
51  McGinnis & Roche, supra note 50, at 36.  
52  Tom Jeffreys, Can Bitcoin Save Argentina's Flailing Economy?, DIGG (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://digg.com/2016/argentina-bitcoin.  
53  See generally BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 36. 
54  BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 36, at 20.  
55  Id.  
56  Id. at 6. 
57  Thomas Lowenthal, Bitcoin: Inside the Encrypted, Peer-to-Peer Digital Currency, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 8, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/06/bitcoin-inside-the-encrypted-
peer-to-peer-currency/.  
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On the other hand, the cryptocurrency market has been extremely 
volatile as investors are eager to participate in mining and speculation.58 
Such volatility would seriously undermine the function of transactional 
cryptocurrency as a medium to store value. For instance, although its initial 
offering was around $0.08, bitcoin reached its peak value of $19,000 in 
December 2017.59 The decentralized nature also does not allow national 
central banks to stabilize bitcoin value.60 Therefore, bitcoin might lack the 
faith and credit that has allowed national currencies to successfully function 
and resist crises.61  
With astronomical price surges, the cryptocurrency market becomes 
highly susceptible to Ponzi schemes, scams and fraud.62 As the Chinese 
government has traditionally banned individual cross-border investment 
and limited corporate investment overseas,63 unwitting investors mistook 
certain ICO Ponzi schemes as profitable opportunities beyond government 
control, some even gambling all their retirement savings.64 In the U.S., the 
SEC halted a $15 million ICO Ponzi scheme where Plexcorp, by issuing 
Plexcoin, promised investors over 1,300% return-on-investment in a 
month.65 Slightly more elaborate fraud includes Centra Tech, which raised 
$32 million by offering CTR Tokens for its supposed debit card service 
backed by Visa and MasterCard that would allow users to instantly convert 
cryptocurrencies into fiats.66   
                                                          
58  Id. 
59  Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ (last visited Sept. 
15, 2018). 
60  See Zhao, supra note 50.  
61  McGinnis & Roche, supra note 50; cf. see commentary, supra note 50. 
62  See Laura Shin, From Blockchains To Mooncakes: Two Chinese Crypto Founders on the ICO 
and Bitcoin Exchanges Ban, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/19/from-blockchains-to-mooncakes-two-chinese-
crypto-founders-on-the-ico-and-bitcoin-exchanges-ban/#7f91489d6a3d.  
63  See China May Be Set to Loosen Outbound Investment, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-21/stable-china-markets-revive-talk-of-plan-for-
outbound-investors.  
64 Bitcoin: An Absolute Ponzi Scheme, supra note 47. Qiming Li, the CEO of Bitcoin China 
said, “from the technological perspective, you’ll understand that bitcoin cannot be regulated. Chinese 
people like it” (translation by author). 
65  Press Release, SEC, SEC Emergency Action Halts ICO Scam (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-219.  
66  Press Release, SEC, SEC Halts Fraudulent Scheme Involving Unregistered ICO (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-53.  
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II.  CURRENT REGULATORY LANDSCAPE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 
A. U.S. Federal Agencies Place Cryptocurrency Within Existing 
Regulatory Frameworks.67  
1. The U.S. Constitution Has Not Barred the Creation of Virtual 
Currency.  
Article I, § 8(5) of the U.S. Constitution reserves the power to coin 
money and regulate its value exclusively to the Federal Government.68 
However, statutes that prohibit the circulation and use of “unauthorized 
instruments” functioning like currency have not been interpreted to prohibit 
any forms of virtual currency.69 So far, these statutes have been exclusively 
applied to prosecute counterfeited dollar bills and coins.70   
                                                          
67 However, certain states proposed more specific regulations. For instance, in mid-2015, New 
York regulators published the final version of their BitLicense regulations, which regulate the use of 
cryptocurrency. New York’s BitLicense allows New York “persons” to engage in certain virtual 
currency business activities, such as operating an exchange or wallet, or issuing virtual currency. 
Merchants who simply want to accept virtual currency in exchange for goods or services, however, do 
not need a BitLicense. See Michael Bobelian, NY’s BitLicense Reveals the Difficult Trade-offs of 
Regulating Bitcoin, FORBES (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2015/06/08/nys-bitlicense-reveals-the-difficult-trade-
offs-of-regulating-bitcoin/#3dae301822bc; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2 (2015) 
(defining person as “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, joint stock association, trust, 
or other entity, how- ever organized”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.3 (“No Person 
shall, without a license obtained from the superintendent as provided in this Part, engage in any Virtual 
Currency Business Activity.”). Also, California unsuccessfully attempted to amend its Assembly Bill 
1326, which sought to regulate “digital currency business.” by asking every cryptocurrency holder to 
register for a license before they could buy or sell goods or services. See generally, H.B. 1326, 2015–
2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (withdrawn).  
68  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.  
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2018); Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Note and Comment, Speculative Tech: The 
Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 85, 94-98 (2014). In 
particular, the Stamp Payments Act of 1862 states:  
Whoever makes, issues, circulates, or pays out any note, check, memorandum, token, or other 
obligation for a less sum than $1, intended to circulate as money or to be received or used in 
lieu of lawful money of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than six months, or both.  
18 U.S.C. § 336 (2018). 
70  See Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, 18 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 65 
(2015); but cf. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of North Carolina, Defendant 
Convicted of Minting His Own Currency (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-
releases/2011/defendant-convicted-of-minting-his-own-currency (“Along with the power to coin 
money, Congress has the concurrent power to restrain the circulation of money which is not issued under 
its own authority in order to protect and preserve the constitutional currency for the benefit of all citizens 
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2. FinCEN Treats Exchanges of Cryptocurrency as Money Services 
Business. 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen), a branch of the 
U.S. Department of Treasury, has treated bitcoin exchanges as monetary 
services, requiring cryptocurrency administrators to register as a money 
services business (“MSB”) under the Bank Secrecy Act.71 In its 2013 
Guidance, FinCen distinguished virtual currency from currency.72 While 
“real” currency is characterized as “the coin and paper money of the United 
States or of any other country that is designated as legal tender . . . ,” virtual 
currency is “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some 
environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency.”73  
FinCen also defines the money transmission services as “the acceptance 
of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one 
person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that 
substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means.”74 
Under this definition, a user who obtains a cryptocurrency and uses it to 
purchase real or virtual goods or services is not an MSB according to 
FinCEN’s regulations,75 “but an administrator or exchanger that (1) accepts 
                                                          
of the nation. It is a violation of federal law for individuals . . . to create private coin or currency systems 
to compete with the official coin and currency of the United States.”). 
71 DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter FINCEN GUIDANCE], http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-
G001.pdf. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, money services businesses like check cashers, money 
transmitters, and currency exchanges, must register with the Department of the Treasury. 31 U.S.C. § 
5330 (2018); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2018). The statute uses the term “money transmitting business,” but 
the regulations use the term “money services businesses.” “Failure to register can result in civil and 
criminal penalties. Once registered, money services businesses must maintain anti-money laundering 
programs. They also have specific reporting and recordkeeping requirements that are designed to help 
law enforcement officials detect criminal activity and determine the identity of the criminals.” Hill, 
supra note 70, at 67. See 31 U.S.C. § 5330(e); 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2018); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210.  
72 FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 1. 
73  See 31 CFR § 1010.100(m) (2018); FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 1. 
74  31 CFR § 1010.100(ff) (2018). 
75  FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 72. Nevertheless, in footnote 1, FinCEN included a disclaimer 
that this definition should not be interpreted as a statement about the extent to which the user’s “activities 
comport with other federal or state statutes, rules, regulations, or orders.” According to footnote 8,  
the activity may still be subject to abuse in the form of trade-based money laundering or terrorist 
financing. The activity may follow the same patterns of behavior observed in the ‘real’ 
economy with respect to the purchase of ‘real’ goods and services, such as systematic over- or 
under-invoicing or inflated transaction fees or commissions.  
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and transmits a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells convertible 
virtual currency for any reason is a money transmitter under FinCEN’s 
regulations.”76  
3. While the SEC and Federal District Courts Characterize Bitcoin 
as a Form of Currency, Other Tokens that Raise Funds through 
Bitcoin or Ether Constitute Securities. 
In SEC v. Shavers, a federal district court in 2013 defined bitcoin as “an 
electronic form of currency unbacked by any real asset and without specie, 
such as coin or precious metal,”77 recognizing that “[i]t is not regulated by 
a central bank or any other form of governmental authority; instead, the 
supply of bitcoins is based on an algorithm which structures a decentralized 
peer-to-peer transaction system.”78 Bitcoin especially “can be used as 
money” because it can be used to purchase goods and services, living 
expenses, and it can be exchanged for “conventional currencies.”79 The 
court recognized that, although bitcoin's acceptance in only a handful of 
places limits its use as money, it was nonetheless a “currency or form of 
money” because it can be exchanged for conventional currencies.80 
Similarly, the DAO Report from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) claims that an investment of ether is equivalent to an investment 
of money at least for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Howey 
test.81 
Striving to curb fraud, courts and the SEC also concluded that financing 
instruments that used bitcoin or ether constituted a form of security under 
SEC v. W.J. Howey. Both the Shavers court and the SEC found that the 
                                                          
Id. at 2, n. 8. 
76 FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 3. An administrator is “a person engaged as a business 
in issuing (putting into circulation) a virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem (to withdraw 
from circulation) such virtual currency.” Id. at 2. 
77 See SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (citing Derek A. Dion, I’ll 
Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E–Conomy 
of Hacker–Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL'Y 165, 167 (2013). 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at *2. 
80  Id. 
81  SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO, RELEASE NO. 81207, 11 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter The DAO 
Report].  
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transactions or tokens met the three-factor Howey test because these 
transactions involve (1) an investment of money or in the form of money, 
(2) in a common enterprise, and (3) with the expectation that profits will be 
derived from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.82 Such 
characterization places cryptocurrency within the reach of the Securities 
Act, requiring token issuers either to file registration requirements with the 
SEC or obtain adequate exemption.83  
Nevertheless, no federal court has declared whether major 
cryptocurrencies like bitcoin or ether constitute securities. In fact, William 
Hinman, Director of Corporation Finance Division of the SEC recently 
announced ether was not a security (“The Hinman Speech”).84 This is 
because the decentralized nature of bitcoin and ether would fail to meet the 
third prong of the Howey test.85 The sufficiently decentralized structure of 
bitcoin and ether suggested that no “central third party” even existed to meet 
the profit-seeking expectation of investors.86 In addition, the SEC 
considered that applying the disclosure regime of the securities laws to the 
offers and resale of bitcoin “would seem to add little value.”87 
4. The CFTC Characterizes Virtual Currency as a Form of 
Commodity.88 
 In an action against Coinflip, Inc. in 2015, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) determined that bitcoin and other virtual 
currencies are commodities, under the inclusive definition of Section 1a(9) 
of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) that “commodity” includes, 
                                                          
82  Id. (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946)); Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 
2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (citing Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 (1989)).  
83  See 15 U.S.C. §77l(a) (2018); 15 U.S.C. §77e(a) (2018). 
84  William Hinman, Dir., SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets 
Summit: Crypto (June 14, 2018) [hereinafter The Hinman Speech], 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id.  
88  Initially, CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton called bitcoin a “shadow currency” and potential 
“house of cards.” Interview by CNBC with Bart Chilton, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n (May 7, 2013), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000166533&play=1. Later, the CFTC 
granted registration to three swap execution facilities. See Press Release, Commodities Futures Trading 
Comm’n, CFTC Grants Registration to 3 Swap Execution Facilities (May 26, 2016), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7375-16.    
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among other things, “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”89 In 2016, the CFTC 
took action against Bitfinex, because the company operated an online 
exchange and trading platform of cryptocurrencies without registration and 
failed to meet the “actual delivery” requirement that would otherwise have 
excepted the transactions from CFTC’s jurisdiction under Section 
2(c)(2)(D)(ii)(III)(aa) of the CEA.90   
To clarify its jurisdiction, the CFTC explicitly declined any authority to 
conduct regulatory oversight over “cash or ‘spot’ transactions in virtual 
currencies or . . . over participants on such platforms.”91 While the CFTC 
oversees futures, swaps and other derivatives markets, its jurisdiction does 
not extend to currency exchange platforms or other cash commodities, 
“including imposing registration requirements, surveillance and monitoring 
. . . .”92 However, this limitation does not preclude the CFTC’s enforcement 
jurisdiction over police fraud and manipulation in both derivatives markets 
and in the underlying spot markets. For instance, the CFTC charged 
Entrepreneurs Headquarters Limited, a UK-registered company, with 
engaging in a fraudulent scheme whereby the company solicited at least 
$1.1 million worth of bitcoin from the investing public, misrepresented that 
the funds would be pooled and invested in products including binary 
options, made Ponzi-style payments to commodity pool participants from 
other participants’ funds, misappropriated pool participants’ funds, and 
failed to register with the CFTC as required.93 
 
 
                                                          
89 Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, 2015 WL 5535736, *3 (Sept. 17, 2015) (order making 
findings & imposing remedial sanctions); 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2018).  
90  BXFNA Inc., CFTC No. 16-19 (June 2, 2016) (order making findings & imposing remedial 
sanctions). 
91  Written Testimony Before the S. Banking Comm., (2018) (testimony of J. Christopher 
Giancarlo, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo37#P48_15664.   
92  Id. 
93  Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief, Restitution, & Civil Monetary Penalties 
Under the Commodity Exchange Act at ¶¶ 1-2, 5-6, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Entrepreneurs Headquarters, No. 18-cv-00345 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018).  
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5. The IRS Characterizes Virtual Currency as Property. 
On March 25, 2014, the IRS issued Notice 2014-21, which established 
that for federal tax purposes, all virtual currency is treated as property, not 
as currency.94 According to the Notice, virtual currency is not legal tender 
in the US or any other jurisdiction.95 When cryptocurrency has an equivalent 
value in real currency or acts as a substitute for real currency, it is referred 
to as convertible virtual currency.96 Therefore, the fair market value of 
convertible virtual currency “paid as wages is subject to federal income tax 
withholding, federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax, and Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax.”97  
B. In Addition to Its Heightened Control over Currency and Virtual 
Currency, China Announced Cryptocurrency-Specific Regulations. 
1. China Has Long Forbidden Private Issuance of Token Tickets 
and Imposed Stringent Control Over Overseas Cash Transactions. 
The Law on People’s Bank of China designates the People’s Bank of 
China (“PBoC”) the sole authority to issue currency and manage the 
currency circulation.98 Article 20 forbids any unit or person other than the 
PBoC from printing or issuing token tickets that could replace renminbi.99 
Article 16 emphasizes that renminbi is the only “legally mandatory 
currency” that no person or unit can refuse payment in renminbi especially 
to repay either public or private debt.100  
In addition, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) has 
imposed a $50,000 annual cap on total amount of foreign exchange that an 
                                                          
94  IRS Virtual Currency Guidance, 2014 I.R.B. 21, § 4 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-
16_IRB#NOT-2014-21 (noting that Bitcoin shall be treated as property for tax purposes and will not be 
treated as a currency). 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id.  
98  Zhonghua Renmin Yinhang Fa (中国人民银行法) [Law on People’s Bank of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 18, 1995; rev’d by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Dec. 27, 2003), arts. 4, 20, P.R.C. Laws.   
99  Id. art. 20. 
100 Id. art. 16. 
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individual may acquire.101 To enforce these limitations, the SAFE appoints 
foreign exchange banks to examine, validate, and track each transaction.102 
Both the PBoC and the SAFE explicitly forbid individuals from directly 
investing in foreign capital markets without approval from local foreign 
exchange departments.103 Violation of such rules may result in criminal 
liability.104 
2. China Established Disclosure-Based Regulations on “Virtual 
Currency” in the Online Gaming Industry.105  
China permits two types of entities to engage in the virtual currency 
businesses: online gaming operators (“Game Operators”), and online 
gaming virtual currency exchange service providers (“Service 
Providers”).106 Game Operators are “companies that operate online games 
and issue/provide Virtual Currency,” and Service Providers “are companies 
that provide platform services for online game users to exchange Virtual 
Currency.”107 A single entity cannot be both a Game Operator and a Service 
Provider at the same time.108 Before the 2017 amendment, the prior Interim 
                                                          
101 Guojia Waihui Guanliju Guanyu Yinfa  (“Geren Waihui Guanli Banfa Shishi Xize” de 
Tongzhi [Yibei Xiugai]) (国家外汇管理局关于印发《个人外汇管理办法实施细则》的通知 [已被
修订]) [Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the Detailed Rules for the 
Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of Individual Foreign Exchange (Revised)] 
(promulgated by State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Jan. 5, 2017, effective Feb. 1, 2017), arts. 
2, 11, CLI.4.82957(EN) (Pkulaw).  
102 Id. art. 6. 
103 Id. art. 16.; Geren Waihui Guanli Banfa (个人外汇管理办法) [Measures for the 
Administration of Individual Foreign Exchange] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China on Dec. 25, 
2006, effective Feb. 1, 2007), art. 34, CLI.4.82813(EN) (Pkulaw). 
104 Geren Waihui Guanli Banfa (个人外汇管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of 
Individual Foreign Exchange] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China on Dec. 25, 2006, effective Feb. 
1, 2007), art. 39, CLI.4.82813(EN) (Pkulaw). 
105 “Virtual currency” is defined as a medium of exchange existing in intangible form, but it used 
to be uncertain whether it may substitute a legal tender status. See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Note, Nerdy 
Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 111, 127-28 (2012). 
106 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, MARKET ENTRY: VIRTUAL CURRENCY, 
ELECTRONIC MONEY AND ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS, 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/6/1/v2/613/MarketEntryVirtualCurrency.pdf.  
107 Id. 
108 Id.; see also Wangluo Youxi Guanli Zanxing Banfa (网络游戏管理暂行办法) [Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Online Games] (promulgated by the Ministry of Culture, June 3, 
2010, effective Aug. 1, 2010; rev’d by the Ministry of Culture, Dec. 15, 2017, effective Dec. 15, 2017) 
[hereinafter Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Games], art 6.  
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Measures for the Administration of Online Games imposed a minimum 
registered capital requirement of RMB 10 million (about U.S. $1.6 million 
in 2013) on Game Operators and Service Providers,109 and required an 
Internet Content Provider License.110 A Game Operator is also required to 
obtain an Internet Culture Operation Permit, where it must disclose to 
prospective users the virtual currency, unit price, method of purchase, and 
security measures that it will establish to protect the interests of the users.111 
3. In 2013, China Permitted Exchanges of “Online Commodities,” 
Only Prohibiting Financial Institutions from Engaging in Bitcoin-
Related Businesses.  
In December 2013, PoBC and four other ministries together released a 
statement regarding bitcoin and other virtual currencies (“the 2013 
Announcement”), declaring that bitcoin is not a currency, but it would be 
treated as a “virtual asset or digital commodity.”112 The 2013 
Announcement explicitly disallowed financial institutions and payment 
companies from engaging in bitcoin-related businesses.113 While the 2013 
Announcement prohibited bitcoin as a payment instrument for goods and 
services, the investing public was free to buy and sell “online commodities,” 
                                                          
109 However, the most recent amendment eliminated the capital registration requirement. See 
Wenhuabu Guanyu Feizhi he Xiugai Bufen Guizhang de Jueding (文化部关于废止和修改部分部门规
章的决定) [Ministry of Culture’s Decision to Amend and Abolish Certain Departmental Rules] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Culture, Dec. 15, 2017, effective Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Ministry 
of Culture’s Decision to Amend and Abolish Certain Departmental Rules], art. 2, CLI.4.308365 
(Pkulaw).  
110 See Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Games, supra note 109, art. 6; see 
generally Wangluo Youxi Xuni Huobi Faxing Qiye, Wangluo Youxi Xuni Huobi Jiaoyi Qiye Shenbao 
Zhinan (网络游戏虚拟货币发行企业、网络游戏虚拟货币交易企业申报指南) [Registration 
Guidance for Issuers of Online Gaming Virtual Currency, Online Gaming Virtual Currency Exchange 
Enterprises] (promulgated by the Ministry of Culture, July 20, 2009, effectively July 20, 2009), art. 2, 
CLI 4.119606 (Pkulaw) (China). 
111 Id.   
112 Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang, Gonye he Xinxihua Bu, Zhongguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli 
Weiyuanhui deng Guanyu Fangfan Bitebi de Tongzhi (中国人民银行、工业和信息化部、中国银行
业监督管理委员会等关于防范比特币风险的通知) [Announcement of Preventing Risks of Bitcoin by 
People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China’s Banking Regulatory 
Comm. and Other Departments] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, China’s Banking Regulatory Comm., China’s Securities Regulatory Comm., 
& China’s Insurance Regulatory Com. Dec. 3, 2013, effective Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 
Announcement], art. 1, CLI.4.214081 (Pkulaw).  
113 Id. art. 2. 
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implying that exchanges among bitcoin and cryptocurrencies were not 
prohibited.114 Meanwhile, the 2013 Announcement warned the public about 
the anonymous nature of bitcoin and declared it a “speculative asset.” 115 
The Chinese government also claimed to increase oversight of bitcoin-
related websites and reduce money laundering risks associated with 
bitcoin.116 Although the 2013 Announcement only claimed to broadly 
regulate cryptocurrency “from a very macro-level, not [to] blindly try to 
regulate a market in its infancy,”117 the price of bitcoin still dropped by 
about 50% afterwards.118 
4. In 2017, China Banned Cryptocurrency Financing and ICOs, and 
Shut Down Crypto-Exchange Platforms. 
Twelve months before the crackdown, China dominated the bitcoin 
exchanges market, accounting for more than 90% of trade volume.119 The 
heyday did not last. In September of 2017, the PBoC and five other 
ministries announced that financings using cryptocurrency, such as ICOs, 
are “in nature unauthorized illegal public financing , and [are] suspected of 
[being involved] in the illegal sale of coins, illegal issuance of securities, 
illegal fundraising, financial fraud, pyramid sale and other illegal and 
criminal activities.”120 This 2017 Announcement also restated the 
                                                          
114 Id. 
115 Id. arts. 4, 5.  
116 Id. art. 3. 
117 Jack Wang, China's Statement on Bitcoin Is Open to Interpretation, COINDESK (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-china-statement-interpretation/ (quoting S, one of the owners of 
Yibite, a Bitcoin media operated by some of the top miners and holders in China). 
118 Eric Mu, China’s Bitcoin Exchanges Survived the Crackdown and Did Battle in the Aftermath, 
COINDESK (Jan. 12, 2014), https://www.coindesk.com/chinas-bitcoin-exchanges-survived-the-
crackdown-battle-aftermath/.  
119 See Samuel Haig, JPY, USD, and KRW Accounts for Over 90% of Bitcoin Traded on 
Exchanges, BITCOIN.COM (Oct. 17, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/jpy-usd-krw-accounts-90-bitcoin-
traded-exchanges/.  
120 Gongshang Zongju deng Qibumen Guanyu Fangfan Daibi (工商总局等七部门关于防范代币
发行融资风险的公告) [Announcement of the People's Bank of China, the Office of the Central Leading 
Group for Cyberspace Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and Other 
Departments on Preventing the Financing Risks of Initial Coin Offerings] (promulgated by People's 
Bank of China, the Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology etc. Sept. 4, 2017, effective Sept. 4, 2017) [hereinafter The 2017 
Announcement], art. 1, CLI.4.301348 (Pkulaw) (“代币发行融资是指融资主体通过代币的违规发售
、流通，向投资者筹集比特币、以太币等所谓“虚拟货币”，本质上是一种未经批准非法公开融
资的行为，涉嫌非法发售代币票券、非法发行证券以及非法集资、金融诈骗、传销等违法犯罪
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government’s position in the 2013 Announcement that bitcoin, ether, and 
other cryptocurrencies do not function as money because they have no 
“legal tender status” and their use “is not legally mandatory.”121  
Although the 2017 Announcement categorized bitcoin as “coin 
substitution” or “virtual currency” without addressing the cryptographic 
aspect of the currency,122 it explicitly banned any exchange between fiat 
money and “coin substitution,” and the circulation of such “coin 
substitution.”123 The Announcement also explicitly prohibited any offering 
or financing activities of cryptocurrency,124 and required organizations or 
individuals that “completed” the crypto-financing to terminate the 
investment contracts and “dispose of risks in an appropriate manner.”125  
The 2017 Announcement also delegitimized “the so-called coin 
financing exchange platform[s].”126 It not only restated the position in the 
2013 Announcement, but also further limited financial institutions from 
trading, pricing, or acting as an agency for crypto exchanges.127 Unlike the 
2013 Announcement, the 2017 Announcement articulated that a violation 
of the regulation would result in revocation of the financial institution’s 
business license.128 Nevertheless, the 2017 Announcement did not mention 
any pecuniary or criminal liabilities for any regulatory noncompliance, 
                                                          
活动”) [ICO means that the major financing mechanism is through token sales and exchanges, collecting 
so-called “virtual currency” such as bitcoin and ether from investors; in essence it is an unauthorized 
public financing activity, which is suspected of illegal sole of tokens, illegal offering of securities, illegal 
crowdfunding, financial fraud, multi-level marketing and other illegal, criminal activities].   
121 Id.  
122 Id. The literal meaning of the word “代币” is coin substitution.  
123 Id. However, this sweeping ban does not explicitly mention blockchain technology, mining or 
other cryptocurrency-related developments. It only bans initial coin offering and cryptocurrency 
transactions.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. art. 2. However, the 2017 Announcement does not require relevant trading platforms to 
return bitcoins or other cryptocurrencies to individual investors. See Xiao Wei (来源), Lushi Guandian: 
ICO Xiangmu Qing Tui=Tui Bi ma? (律师观点ICO项目清退=“退币”吗?),  SOHU (Sept. 9, 2017) 
[hereinafter Attorney’s Opinion: Does Discharge from Initial Coin Offering Equal Return of Bitcoins?], 
http://www.sohu.com/a/190791942_355147. In reality, Chinese crypto companies offered investors 
options to obtain refund, but almost no investors have requested one. See Laura Shin, From Blockchains 
To Mooncakes: Two Chinese Crypto Founders On The ICO And Bitcoin Exchanges Ban, FORBES (Sept. 
19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/19/from-blockchains-to-mooncakes-two-
chinese-crypto-founders-on-the-ico-and-bitcoin-exchanges-ban/#7f91489d6a3d. 
126 The 2017 Announcement, supra note 121, art. 3.  
127 Id. art. 4. 
128 Id. 
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especially against entities that are not registered as “financial 
institutions.”129 The Announcement also did not explicitly forbid exchanges 
or transactions among cryptocurrencies, nor did it ban mining or attempt to 
place any blockchain development under surveillance.  
The market response to the 2017 Announcement was intriguing. 
Although bitcoin price dropped over $1,000 within a few days after the 
crackdown, its price resurged a few days after.130 Bitcoin China closed its 
transaction platform allegedly “responding to the ‘spirit of the 
Announcement,’”131 and some Chinese crypto-trading platform founders 
not only anticipated but also strategically planned for the crackdown. For 
instance, Qtum, a Chinese blockchain smart contract application company 
was founded in Singapore.132  NEO, a similar blockchain project explored 
the most favorable jurisdiction for its smart contracts projects, and hoped to 
enable its users to transact bitcoins legally across borders.133  
III.      WHY DID CHINA PRESUME CRYPTOCURRENCY TO BE “BAD,” BUT 
THE U.S DID NOT?   
A. While the U.S. Recognizes Certain Cryptocurrencies as Functional 
Equivalents to Fiats, China Explicitly, Yet Only Nominally, 
Delegitimizes Such Function in Order to Preserve Its Regulatory 
Strength in Capital Control. 
Like every major economy, following the collapse of the gold standard, 
both the U.S. and China issued paper fiat currency, the value of which relies 
on public belief that the sovereign government will always stabilize the 
supply of new banknotes.134 However, the U.S. adopted a flexible approach 
                                                          
129 Id. art. 1.   
130 Frank Chaparro, Here’s Why the Crackdown on Bitcoin in China Is ‘Not a Real Problem’ for 
the Digital Currency, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-
price-stable-despite-china-crackdown-2017-9. 
131 See Attorney’s Opinion: Does Discharge from Initial Coin Offering Equal Return of Bitcoins?, 
supra note 126.    
132 See QTUM, https://qtum.org/en/; see also CRUNCHBASE, 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/qtum.  
133 See NEO, https://neo.org/. 
134 See David Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal, in HANDBOOK OF 
DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA 31 (David Lee 
Kuo Chuen ed., 2015).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
478    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 18:457 
 
  
 
 
recognizing bitcoin as a functional substitute for “real” currency.135 
Although FinCEN limited the definition of “real” currency to those with 
legal tender, it openly recognized virtual currency as a substitute for real 
currency.136 In contrast, irrespective of its technological reality (or 
potential),137 China disregarded the cryptocurrency’s function as 
“currency,” explicitly declaring that bitcoin simply could not function like 
a currency in the absence of legal tender.138  
Categorizing cryptocurrency as a functional equivalent to fiat currency 
allowed U.S. regulators to place cryptocurrency into its existing regulatory 
framework. Practically, without such recognition, FinCEN would not be 
able to require a bitcoin administrator or exchanger to be subject to the Bank 
Secrecy Act.139 In contrast, Chinese regulators were less concerned with 
jurisdiction; rather, they assert direct control, nominally eliminating any 
likelihood that would undermine their existing regulatory efficiency. Given 
China’s capital control policy, if the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (“SAFE”) had placed cryptocurrency into its existing supervision 
of monetary services and capital flow, its appointed banks would have 
burdened itself to a technologically impossible mission of tracking and 
imposing limitations upon each encrypted, anonymous cryptocurrency 
transaction from every Chinese user.140 Since the appointed banks only 
monitor capital outflow from an individual’s bank account, the SAFE and 
                                                          
135 FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 72; SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182, 
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (citing Derek A. Dion, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a 
Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E–Conomy of Hacker–Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & 
POL'Y 165, 167 (2013).   
136 See FINCEN GUIDANCE, supra note 72.  
137 See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 7, at 504. 
138 Ministry of Culture’s Decision to Amend and Abolish Certain Departmental Rules, supra note 
110. Bitcoin cannot function as money because it has no “legal tender status” and its use is not legally 
mandatory.  
139 See Douglas King, Banking Bitcoin-Related Businesses: A Primer for Managing BSA/AML 
Risks (Oct. 2015, revised Feb. 2016) (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Retail Payments Risk Forum 
Working Paper), https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/rprf/rprf_pubs/2016/banking-bitcoin-
related-businesses.pdf. 
140 Nicholas Godlove, Regulatory Overview of Virtual Currency, 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21, 
39 (2014). Another explanation is that because of the stringent capital control policy, China does not 
have any equivalent regulatory framework of monetary services business. However, China’s central 
bank has proposed to develop its state-owned, centralized cryptocurrency. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
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appointed banks were unlikely to have the supervisory capacity to monitor 
crypto transactions that can take place without a Chinese bank account.141 
Knowing the potential challenges from cryptocurrency on current 
monetary regulation, while China is even less willing to loosen control, the 
U.S. is more tolerant of technological uncertainty.142 Contrary to China’s 
nominal declaration that bitcoin is not a legitimate currency in the 2017 
Announcement, the U.S. Federal Reserve claims that it “doesn’t have 
authority to supervise or regulate bitcoin in any way.”143 Instead of being 
cynical about market risks, the Federal Reserve was “trying to understand 
the nature” of bitcoin because of its belief that “innovation using these 
technologies could be extremely helpful and bring benefits to society.”144  
B. With Respect to Financial Applications, While the U.S. Attempts to 
Distinguish Non-Security Cryptocurrencies from Securities Tokens, 
China Drops a Blanket Ban Because Existing Law Might Not 
Effectively Provide Investor Protection.  
Unlike China’s rather abrupt crackdown, the SEC evaluated the 
application of the Howey test on a case by case basis,145 and the Hinman 
Speech drew a distinction in the treatment of cryptocurrency, such as ether, 
                                                          
141 See supra note 112. 
142 Id. 
143 The 2017 Announcement, supra note 121; cf. Ryan Tracy, Yellen: Bitcoin ‘Doesn’t Touch’ 
Banks the Fed Oversees, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/no-headline-
available-1393521584. 
144 Rakesh Sharma, Federal Reserve May Introduce a Cryptocurrency in the Future, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.investopedia.com/news/federal-reserve-may-introduce-
cryptocurrency-future/#ixzz55zIzZAF9. In addition, former Chairwoman Janice Yellen recognized that: 
[Blockchain] is a very important, new technology that could have implications for the way in 
which transactions are handled throughout the financial system. We’re looking at it in terms of 
its promise in some of the technologies we use ourselves and many financial institutions are 
looking at it. It could make a big difference to the way in which transactions are cleared and 
settled in the global economy. 
Stan Higgins, Fed Chair Yellen: Blockchain is an ‘Important Technology’, COINDESK (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://www.coindesk.com/fed-yellen-blockchain-important-tech/. However, William Dudley, president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, only hinted at the prospect of a Fed-issued cryptocurrency 
in the future. “It’s really very premature to be talking about the Federal Reserve offering digital 
currencies, but it is something we are thinking about,” he said. See Sharma, Federal Reserve May 
Introduce a Cryptocurrency in the Future, supra.    
145 Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *3; see, e.g., Munchee, Inc., S.E.C. Release 
No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter The Munchee Order] (order instituting cease-and-desist 
proceedings). 
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and other tokens that entered the market through ICOs.146 While the Hinman 
Speech, in effect, relieved Ethereum from a costly registration requirement 
under the Securities Act,147 it did not offer a categorical answer to the 
question of whether certain “utility tokens” are securities.148 The claimed 
technological divergence between “utility tokens” and “security tokens” 
might theoretically challenge the legal definition of securities because the 
consumptive motive in using such tokens potentially trumps the profit-
making expectation, failing the expectation of profits prong under Howey.149 
Alternatively, if token investors expect to profit from resale on secondary 
markets, such profit would not likely be “from the efforts of others” 
because, absent central control, the price at secondary market is merely 
determined by market fluctuations.150  
Despite this alleged “divergence,” the SEC has consistently insisted on 
a broad definition of “security,” stating that securities law has always 
focused on the economic realities of the underlying transactions rather than 
                                                          
146 The Hinman Speech, supra note 85. 
147 Id.  
148 Micha Benoliel, Understanding the Difference Between Coins, Utility Tokens and Tokenized 
Securities, MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/startup-grind/understanding-the-difference-
between-coins-utility-tokens-and-tokenized-securities-a6522655fb91. It appears that the cryptocurrency 
ecology has developed at least two different types of tokens: security tokens and utility tokens. See id.; 
Josiah Wilmoth, ICO 101: Utility Tokens vs. Security Tokens, STRATEGIC COIN (Dec. 17, 2017), 
http://strategiccoin.com/ico-101-utility-tokens-vs-security-tokens/. For instance, Overstock announced 
that its subsidiary, tZERO acknowledged that “issuing digital tokens as securities gives issuers and 
purchasers the greatest certainty about the legal regime that applies to the sale and the widest range of 
options to provide an attractive return for investors.” ICO Market Transformed by ATS Security Token 
Joint Venture Forged by tZERO, RenGen and the Argon Group (Sept. 27, 2017), 
http://investors.overstock.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=131091&p=RssLanding_pf&cat=news&id=2303094. 
In comparison, Filecoin, though using a Rule 506(c) exemption under the Securities Act, aimed to 
provide a decentralized data storage service rather than profit-making securities. FILECOIN, 
https://filecoin.io/; Protocol Labs Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Aug. 7, 2017). 
149 See Protocol Labs, Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale 
Framework (Oct. 2, 2017) (Whitepaper), https://saftproject.com/#saft-whitepaper. 
150 Id. (citing Noa v. Key Futures, 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding “no expectation of 
profit from the efforts of others because once the purchase for silver bars was made, the profits to the 
investor depended primarily upon the fluctuations of the silver market, not the managerial efforts of the 
[defendants]”)); SEC v. Belmont Reid, 794 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the expectation 
of profits were not from “the efforts of others” because profits to gold coin purchasers depend primarily 
upon the fluctuations of the gold market). Nevertheless, a counterargument against this interpretation 
would be that “profits,” in reference to expectation-of-profits, can mean “capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment.” United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 
852 (1975).   
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the mere “label” of individual instrument.151 In contrast, China’s Securities 
Law defines “security” narrowly, limiting it to “securities investment fund 
through public or non-public raise of capital . . . , fund by a fund 
management institution, . . . fund [held] by a fund custodian, and securities 
investment activities conducted for the benefit of the fund shareholders.”152 
To qualify as a fund management institution, an entity must have “paid-in 
capital of no less than RMB 100 million.”153 This minimum capital cap 
suggests that most domestic crypto-enterprises do not constitute “fund 
management institutions,” and subsequently, a transaction between 
investors and these non-fund management institutions does not qualify as a 
“security.” 154  
At first glance, China’s narrow definition of “security” seems to 
contradict its paternalistic tendency evidenced in the crackdown of the 
allegedly illegal cryptocurrency transactions. However, unlike the SEC’s 
mission,155 China’s Securities Regulatory Committee (“CSRC”) battles 
with the duality of both creating a securities market and maintaining active 
control over the relatively nascent market.156 The enactment of the 
                                                          
151 See S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004); The Hinman Speech, supra note 85. 
152 See Zhengquan Fa (证券法) [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Jan. 1, 2006, rev’d by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2014, 
effective Aug. 31, 2014), art. 16, CLI.1.233280 (Pkulaw) (emphasis added). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. §129A “设立证券公司，必须经国务院证券监督管理机构审查批准。未经国务院证
券监督管理机构批准，任何单位和个人不得经营证券业务 [“The establishment or closure of 
branches of a securities company, change in its scope of business, registered capital or articles of 
association, and merger, division, change in its corporate form, and its dissolution shall be subject to 
approval by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council.”]. Therefore, non-security 
companies, including crowdfunding startups, do not fall within the scope of the registration requirement. 
See The Reasonable Definition of "Securities” Should Be the Focus of the Securities Law Amendment 
[“证劵”的合理界定应是《证券法》修订重点], SINA FINANCE (Apr. 12, 2017) 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-04-12/doc-ifyeayzu7660647.shtml.  
155 See What We Do, SEC (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2018) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”).  
156 See Alicia García-Herrero et al., What Explains the Low Profitability of Chinese Banks?, 33 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 2080, 2081 (2009) (Capital market reform has focused on the restructuring of the four 
largest and state-owned commercial banks, “which ha[s] long served as lending arm of state-owned 
enterprises.”). As the marketization progressed, at the end of 2004, China had 133 securities companies, 
and 188 future brokerage houses, and in 2016, China had 4,088 financial institutions including banks. 
Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening up and Steady Growth of Capital 
Market, CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION (Jan. 31, 2004), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/AdministrativeLaws/200907/t20090729_119391.html. 
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Securities Law aims to reform the previously state-owned financial 
structure and to gradually transition to a market economy. One purpose of 
the Securities Law is to “restructure and consolidate the securities industry, 
by building up a supervisory framework following international norms by 
developing a multi-tier capital market system, including the development of 
new financial products, and by expanding the role of institutional investors 
in the market.”157  
China’s paternalistic approach seems to be further undermined because, 
unlike the SEC, the CSRC does not even explicitly aim to protect investors 
or assert jurisdiction in combating securities fraud.158 Instead, the CSRC 
aims to promote “new financial products,” presumably including 
instruments based on cryptocurrency if the crypto-market were not so 
volatile or if it did not join other Chinese regulators in the 2017 
Announcement to delegitimize cryptocurrency transactions.159 Perhaps the 
CSRC’s silence in not characterizing cryptocurrencies as securities, at least 
temporarily, like the PBoC’s denial of cryptocurrency as a functional 
equivalent of fiats, preserves its regulatory consistency and resources, at 
least temporarily.  
If it is not the CSRC’s priority to protect the investing public and no 
other Chinese regulator has specialized in detecting securities fraud, China’s 
2017 Announcement at least nominally deters potential fraud.160 In light of 
such a limited and different institutional capacity compared to the SEC, by 
creating an impression of high risk and fraud, the 2017 Announcement at 
least attempts to discourage the investing public from engaging in 
                                                          
Following the Chinese market reform of 1984, the Shanghai Stock Exchange was reopened in 1990 after 
more than 40 years of shutdown, signaling the opening of China’s capital market. Lena H. Sun, China’s 
Stock Markets Find Foreign Investors Cooling Off, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 1992), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1992/10/13/chinas-stock-markets-find-foreign-
investors-cooling-off/1bf1fbe8-9d35-4351-8589-dd38db583ccc/?.  
157 See What We Do, supra note 156. Also, for instance, in 2001, the CSRC and the State 
Economic and Trade Commission jointly initiated a program inspecting the establishment and 
development of a model corporate governance system in listed companies. Interestingly, China’s 
securities regulators have stepped in corporate governance. Such extension of authority was rarely 
witnessed in equivalent institutions like the SEC. Wei Yuwa, The Development of the Securities Market 
and Regulation in China, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 479, 496 (2005).  
158 See What We Do, supra note 156.  
159 Id.; The 2017 Announcement, supra note 121.  
160 The 2017 Announcement, supra note 121. 
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cryptocurrency-related transactions. Of course, the efficiency of such 
warning is subject to debate, but one might always argue that some alarm is 
better than none.        
C. While Both Countries Characterized Cryptocurrency as a Form of 
Commodity, Only the U.S. Applied Commodities Law to Regulate 
Cryptocurrency Market.  
China’s 2013 Announcement used the language “special virtual 
commodity” to define cryptocurrency.161 This term encompassed reloadable 
cards, which enable users to purchase goods and services online.162 When 
applying the definition on cryptocurrency in general, the 2013 
Announcement temporarily disregarded the transactional anonymity of 
cryptocurrency and treated cryptocurrency as an equivalent to in-game 
currencies–the legitimacy of which were left untouched in the 2017 
Announcement.163 This definition, however, had little resemblance to 
                                                          
161 See Guanyu Yinfa “Zhifu Jigou hulianwang Zhifu Yewu Fengxian Fangfan Zhiyin” (中国支
付清算协会网络支付应用工作委员会关于印发《支付机构互联网支付业务风险防范指引》的通
知) [Announcement of Publicizing Payment Institution Guidance of Risk Prevention in Online Payment 
Services] (promulgated by China’s Payment & Clearing Association of China, Mar. 7, 2013, effective 
Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Announcement of Publicizing Payment Institution Guidance of Risk 
Prevention in Online Payment Services], §4.12. Previously, Tencent, one of the largest 
telecommunication companies in China, offered a virtual currency, Q-coin, as a way of purchasing its 
goods and services via QQ, an instant messaging service. Unlike cryptocurrency, Q-coin design was a 
unidirectional transaction because the intention was for users to only buy Q-coins using the fiat money, 
RMB. Even though the initial design’s purpose was to establish unidirectional transaction, as QQ gained 
its popularity Q-coin became so popular that users and merchants began to use it among themselves in 
the transactions of real-world goods and services. Chinese authorities discovered that in a given year the 
Q-coin transactions amounted to billions of RMB with annual growth estimated at 20%. In June 2009, 
the Chinese authorities decided to ban this currency for trading in real goods in order to “limit its possible 
impact on the real financial system.” See Godlove, supra note 141, at 53. Bitcoin could allow China to 
see the similarity between the digital currency and cryptocurrency. As Q-coin was recognized as a form 
of digital commodity, it was logical to treat cryptocurrency initially as commodity as well. Id.   
162 Announcement of Publicizing Payment Institution Guidance of Risk Prevention in Online 
Payment Services, supra note 162.  
163 See id.; see also The 2017 Announcement, supra note 121. Typical in-game currencies include 
World of Warcraft Gold, Linden Dollars, or vendor-specific currencies like Microsoft Points, airline 
miles etc. While China treated cryptocurrency as a form of commodity, no record indicated whether 
blockchain participants were compelled to comply with China’s regulation on commodity futures. 
Nevertheless, the Regulation on the Administration of Futures Trading has always applied a limited 
definition where the “futures trading” was characterized as “future contracts or option contracts . . . in 
the manner of centralized public trading or any other manner approved by the futures regulatory 
authority of the State Council.” Qihuo Jiaoyi Guanli Tiaoli (期货交易管理条例) [Regulation on the 
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China’s Commodities Futures Law, which narrowly defines “commodity 
futures” as only “agriculture products, industrial products, energy and other 
commodities and associated index products.”164 In contrast, the CFTC 
placed cryptocurrency within its broad definition of a commodity.165 CFTC 
has classified bitcoin as a commodity, defining it as “a digital representative 
of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or 
a store of value, but does not have legal tender status.”166  
However, unlike the U.S. securities law, the broad definition of 
commodity does not grant the CFTC broad jurisdiction in cryptocurrency 
market. The CFTC in fact acknowledges that “[w]here market participants 
are simply buying and selling bitcoin on an exchange, we wouldn’t have 
oversight responsibilities for those exchanges.”167 Though such limitations 
do not limit the CFTC’s enforcement authority against fraud, the CFTC 
seems to only have supervisory authority over “contracts for sale of 
                                                          
Administration of Futures Trading] (promulgated by St. Council, Mar. 1, 2017, effective Mar. 1, 2017) 
[hereinafter Regulation on the Administration of Futures Trading], art. 1, CLI.2.293183.  
164 See Regulation on the Administration of Futures Trading, supra note 164, art. 85 (1) (“Futures 
contract (qihuo heyue) refers to a standard contract uniformly formulated by futures exchange which 
stipulates for deliveries of a thing of a certain quantity at a certain time and place in the future. According 
to the different things involved in a contract, futures contract is divided into commodity futures contract 
and financial futures contract. The objects of commodity futures contracts include agriculture products, 
industrial products, energy and other commodities and associated index products; the objects of financial 
futures contracts include financial products like securities, interest rate, exchange rate and so on and 
associated index products.”).  
165 In 1974, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, which amended 
the CEA's definition of “commodity” to include “all other goods and articles, except onions . . . and all 
services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future . . . .” 
CEA § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1974). By this amendment, literally anything other than onions could 
become a “commodity” and thereby subject to CFTC regulation simply by its futures being traded on 
some exchange. The legislative history shows that the purpose of the enlarged definition was to allow 
regulation of futures contracts and other transactions in a growing number of commodities such as 
coffee, sugar, and foreign currencies that were then being traded on and off commodity exchanges and 
that had been unregulated under the prior version of the CEA.  
166 See United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 709-710 (2016) (citing Coinflip, Inc., CFTC 
No. 15-29, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept. 17, 2015). 
167 See Pete Rizzo, CFTC Commissioner: Market Manipulation Could Shape 
Bitcoin’s Future, COINDESK (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/cftc- commissioner-mark-wetjen-
bitcoin/. Mark Wetjen, CFTC Commissioner, said the following statutory language provides the 
strongest support for the inclusion of Bitcoin futures contracts within the CEA: “[A] commodity includes 
any ‘rights or interests in which a contract for future delivery is or will be dealt in,’ and it’s that part of 
the definition that I think best captures something like bitcoin.” Id. 
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[cryptocurrency];” and “those contracts that are traded on exchanges”—in 
other words, options and futures contracts.168  
Interestingly, even though China adopts a narrow definition of 
commodity securities, like the CFTC, China has, in fact, incorporated option 
contracts in the 2007 Regulations on the Administration of Futures Trading, 
defining them as “a standard contract uniformly formulated by futures 
exchange which stipulates that buyer has right to purchase or sell an object 
agreed upon (including futures contracts) at a certain time and a specified 
price in the futures.”169 Under this definition, the CSRC could have placed 
certain cryptocurrency offerings within its regulatory framework of 
commodity futures, imposing disclosure rules and the RMB 30 million 
minimum registered capital requirement.170 Why didn’t it? Perhaps the 
CSRC already deals with too many regulatory issues, and therefore faces 
constraints in resources. Unlike the CFTC, the CSRC is tasked with 
regulating both the securities and commodity futures markets, while 
providing corporate governance rules.171  
IV.  CHINA’S BAN IS NOT THE END, AND TOLERANCE IS NOT 
FLAWLESS. 
A. China’s 2017 Announcement Allows the State to Substitute the 
Market in Developing Blockchain Technology and Even a State-
Initiated Cryptocurrency.  
From the regulator’s perspective, China’s seemingly sweeping ban 
saved the CSRC’s limited resources in dealing with uncertain technological 
innovation. More importantly, by disallowing financial institutions in 
cryptocurrency transactions, China might have carved out space in the 
market to allow state-owned banks to launch their own blockchain 
                                                          
168 Jerry Brito, Bitcoin Financial Regulations: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and 
Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 162 (2014). 
169 Zhu Sanzhu, Legal Aspects of the Commodity and Financial Futures Market in China, 3 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 377, 397 n.122 (2009).  
170 Regulation on the Administration of Futures Trading, supra note 164, arts. 16, 22, 25. 
171 The 1999 Provisional Regulations required that futures trading be conducted in a futures 
exchange, the establishment of which required approval by the CSRC. Before these regulations, futures 
exchanges were established upon approval by local government. Provisional Regulations on the Admin. 
of Futures Trading (promulgated by the St. Council, June 2, 1999, effective Sept. 1, 1999), arts. 4, 6.  
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projects.172 Since the announcement did not prohibit mining or censor 
miners, the PBoC, together with other state-owned commercial banks, has 
initiated projects developing encrypted transaction systems based on 
blockchain technology since early 2017, separating the blockchain 
technology from the speculative financial applications of cryptocurrency.173 
For instance, China Zheshang Bank has proposed its block-chain based 
receivables chain platform to its corporate clients.174 Postal Savings Bank 
of China has cooperated with IBM to develop its asset custody system using 
the Hyperleger Fabric.175 No evidence suggests that these endeavors were 
negatively affected by the 2017 Announcement.  
By closing the door on cryptocurrency transactions, China attempts to 
open another one namely a state-initiated, “centralized” crypto-fiat.176 
While denying cryptocurrency as a form of currency due to the lack of a 
legal tender, the PBoC later proposed that the state-initiated cryptocurrency 
                                                          
172 Xia Zhihua & Liu Liaoqiao (夏智华、刘蓼乔), Weilai Yi Lai: Qu Kuai Lian Rechao Xia de 
Falu Sikao (未来已来：区块链热潮下的法律思考) [The Future Has Come: Legal Thinking under the 
Upsurge of Blockchain], HEXUN (和讯网) (Jan. 4, 2018), http://iof.hexun.com/2018-01-
04/192158902.html  
173 See id.; see also Sujha Sundararajan, PBoC Research Lead: ‘Crucial’ to Issue Central Bank 
Cryptocurrency Soon, COINDESK (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/pboc-research-lead-
crucial-to-issue-central-bank-cryptocurrency-soon/. Qian Yao, the Director of the Digital Currency 
Research Institute of People’s Bank of China explained the importance of introducing digital legal tender 
at a forum in Beijing. Such a move, he said, would help in cutting transaction costs and expanding 
financial services to rural areas, while also increasing the efficiency of the PBoC's monetary policies. 
Qian remarked at the event that “the development of digital economy needs central bank-issued 
electronic currency more than ever.” Id.  
174 Zhengshang Yinhang Tui Yenei Shou Kuan Qu Kuai Lian Ying Shou Kuan Lian Pingtai (浙商
银行推业内首款区块链应收款链平台) [Zhengshang Bank Pushed for the First Receivable Chain 
Platform in the Industry], SCTN (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.stcn.com/2017/0817/13563075.shtml.  
175 Postal Savings Bank of China Teams with IBM to Build Blockchain-Based Asset Custody 
System, IBM (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51358.wss. According 
to IBM’s report,  
PSBC’s blockchain solution enables the real-time sharing of information by multiple parties, 
eliminates repeated credit verifications, which reduces the operation process by about 60%-
80% and helps make information exchanges more efficient. The smart contract and consensus 
mechanism integrates investment compliance verification regulations into the blockchain, and 
ensures that transactions are completed after contracts are satisfied and a consensus is reached. 
The immutability and encryption built into the blockchain ensures that account information 
remains secure while allowing the quick sharing of necessary information by transaction 
participants. 
Id. 
176 Zhao, PBoC Digital Currency Director Calls for Centralized State Cryptocurrency, supra note 
50. 
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or token could compensate for cryptocurrency’s lack of anchoring in 
values.177 Additionally, a state-initiated cryptocurrency would also be 
designed to stabilize and strengthen China’s fiat money.178 There, in 
addition to supplying fiat, the PBoC will provide algorithms,179 and such 
digitalized legal tender would allow the central bank to monitor the velocity 
of digital transactions more closely.180 Also, the launch of digital legal 
tenders will help to reduce transactional costs and expand financial services 
to rural areas.181 If the launch were successful, it would allow the central 
bank to implement more effective monetary policies.182   
B. However, from the Perspective of Investor Protection, China’s 
Sweeping Ban Only Nominally, Rather than Effectively, Deters Fraud. 
The 2017 Announcement would be in vain when a cryptocurrency 
transaction “could be [created and] solely maintained by foreign users and 
in a manner that does not disclose all transactions publicly.”183 As the 2017 
Announcement does not address any cryptocurrency transactions abroad, 
Chinese entrepreneurs or fraudsters have established many cryptocurrency 
transaction platforms overseas, cloaking themselves as foreign enterprises 
but targeting China’s investing public.184 Some offer unregistered option 
contracts, which would be under the jurisdiction of the CSRC, except that 
                                                          
177 See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996) 
(“Regulation in cyberspace is, or can be, different. If the regulator wants to induce a certain behavior, 
she need not threaten, or cajole, to inspire the change. She need only change the code—the software that 
defines the terms upon which the individual gains access to the system, or uses assets on the system . . . 
.”) see also Sara Hsu, After Cracking Down on Bitcoin, China Contemplates Its Own Digital Currency, 
FORBES (Oct. 19. 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2017/10/19/will-china-host-the-worlds-
biggest-state-backed-digital-currency/#50cf0de01231.  
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Polina Chernykh, China’s Central Bank Plans to Launch Its Own State-Backed Digital 
Currency, COINSPEAKER (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.coinspeaker.com/2017/11/06/chinas-central-
bank-plans-launch-state-backed-digital-currency/.  
182 Sarah Dai, China’s Central Bank Is Developing Its Own Digital Currency, Even As It Bans 
Bitcoin and Private Cryptos, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 5, 2017), 
http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2118468/chinas-central-bank-studying-its-own-
digital-currency-even-it.  
183 Kaplanov, Note, supra note 106, at 169. 
184 Mengyan Ren, 数字货币系列调查］禁而不绝的交易所 [Digital Currency Survey – 
Forbidden yet not Eliminated Exchange Platforms], CNR (May 3, 2018), 
http://china.cnr.cn/yaowen/20180503/t20180503_524220165.shtml.  
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the CSRC failed to prioritize investor protection by asserting strenuous 
enforcement efforts to ensure compliance and curb fraud.185  
Such a loophole, in addition to a weak enforcement mechanism, leaves 
investors vulnerable to Ponzi schemes and scams. With no effective 
measure to tame the Wild West, the blanket ban on cryptocurrency 
transactions fosters a premature perception among the public as if 
cryptocurrency were by its nature fraudulent.186 Such norms not only hinder 
meritorious technological improvement, but potentially also undermine 
China’s state-led efforts in offering its own crypto-fiat. It is also uncertain 
whether China’s reliance on state-led initiatives in both blockchain and 
cryptocurrency would be immune from fraud or hacks.  
C. In Comparison, the U.S. Approach Is Better Equipped to Balance 
Investor Protection and Facilitate Technological Improvement. 
Instead of attaching a premature judgment on cryptocurrency 
transactions as a whole, the U.S. approach provides, at least, some 
procedural clarity. For instance, the SEC does not question the merits of 
underlying cryptocurrency transactions as long as the underlying securities 
are registered or obtained through adequate exemptions.187 Although 
regulatory compliance involves costs, the U.S. approach does not stop 
meritorious projects from raising capital. Meanwhile, both the SEC and the 
CFTC have been actively weeding out fraud. Soon after China’s 2017 
announcement, the SEC established a Cyber Unit, targeting at cyber-related 
misconduct, including fraud, market abuse related to cryptocurrency 
transactions.188 Unlike China’s arguably unsubstantiated criticism against 
                                                          
185 Id. 
186 Bite Bi Shang Weibo Re Soule Dan Zhexie Yulun Que Rang Ren Kaixian Bu Qilai (比特币上
微博热搜了 但这些舆论却让人开心不起来) [Bitcoin Is One of the Most Searched Hashtags on Weibo, 
But the Public Comments Are Upsetting], HECAIJING (Sept. 12, 2018), 
http://hecaijing.com/article/show/1536731080743294.html.    
187 See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2018). 
188 SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect 
Retails Investors, SEC PRESS RELEASE (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-
176.  
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cryptocurrency, the SEC has issued investors alerts to educate retailer 
investors and warn the public about what is too good to be true.189       
D. However, Reliance on a Disclosure-Based Regime Might Be Both 
Over- and Under-Inclusive.  
One might argue that applying the U.S. definition of security to all 
cryptocurrency-related transactions could be over-inclusive because certain 
tokens only intend to provide blockchain-based products for consumptive 
rather than profit-making purposes.190 Requiring these transactions to 
register as securities would increase costs and stifle the potential benefits to 
the extent that utility-providing projects would forgo the option of issuing 
any tokens altogether.191 Nevertheless, it is too early to tell whether such 
effects will constitute an unwanted market distortion.  
Meanwhile, since the SEC has announced that Ether does not constitute 
a security, what are these cryptocurrencies?192 Perhaps Bitcoin and Ether 
are allowed to remain in the lawless frontier–at least temporarily beyond the 
reach of the Securities Act. Even though other cryptocurrencies and utility 
tokens are regulated under federal securities regulations, the current 
disclosure-based regime might have overly relied on the “prudence of 
investors,”193 potentially underestimating unprecedented risks such as 
cybersecurity breach and large-scale hacking attacks.194 As institutional 
investors, including Goldman Sachs, become involved in cryptocurrency 
trading, it is uncertain whether the disclosure-based approach will be 
                                                          
189 See id.; SEC, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were 
Securities, SEC PRESS RELEASE (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131.  
190 See Stan Higgins, SEC: U.S. Securities Laws “May Apply” to Token Sales, COINDESK (July 
25, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/securities-exchange-commission-us-securities-laws-may-apply-
token-sales/ (“[The Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to issue this Report in 
order to stress that the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various activities, including distributed 
ledger technology, depending on the particular facts and circumstances, without regard to the form of 
the organization or technology used to effectuate a particular offer or sale.”). 
191 Primavera De Filippi, We Must Regulate Bitcoin. Problem Is, We Don’t Understand It, WIRED 
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/must-understand-bitcoin-regulate/.  
192 The Hinman Speech, supra note 85. 
193 See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case 
for Federal Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 649 (2010). 
194 See, e.g., Steven Russolillo & Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Getting 
Hacked Because It’s Easy, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
cryptocurrency-exchange-hacks-keep-happening-1531656000.    
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
490    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 18:457 
 
  
 
 
sufficient in addressing inherent risks in the anonymity of 
cryptocurrencies.195 
Interestingly, China would likely face the same challenges had the CSRC 
regulated rather than outlawed token offerings. Since 2015, China has 
attempted to amend its Securities Law, replacing the former merit review 
with a disclosure-based framework and enacting a registration system that 
resembles the U.S. federal securities regulation.196 Given the fact that 
Chinese individual investors rather than institutional investors have 
predominated in stock trading volume in recent years,197 the new disclosure-
based regulatory framework, if fully adopted, could expose inexperienced 
retail investors to the unprecedented risks of cryptocurrency trading and 
token offerings with arguably even less recourse against securities fraud 
than in the U.S.198  
V. CONCLUSION 
Although cryptocurrency seemed to force countries to choose between 
banning, tolerating, or cooperating with innovation,199 this Note argues that 
the reasons behind the different regulatory approaches and the effects on 
both the market and the investing public deserve a much more nuanced 
                                                          
195 Kenneth Rapoza, Goldman Sachs Caves: Bitcoin Is Money, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2018),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/01/10/goldman-sachs-caves-bitcoin-is-
money/#33a0c7e674b7; see also Andrew Hinkes, Beyond Regulation: Why Bitcoin’s Pressing Problem 
Is Civil Law, COINDESK (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/beyond-regulation-bitcoin-common-
law-problem/.  
196 See Stuart R. Cohn & Yinzhi Miao, The Dragon and the Eagle: Reforming China’s Securities 
IPO Laws in the U.S. Model, Pros and Cons, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 327, 341-345 (2018); 
see also Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Authorizing the State 
Council to Adjust the Relevant Applicable Provisions of the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Implementation of Stock Issuance Registration System Reform (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2015, effective Mar. 1, 2016), CLI.1.261784 (EN) 
(Pkulaw). 
197 See Cohn & Miao, supra note 197, at 348 (“The data released by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
showed that in 2012 natural person investors held 42.8% of floated capitalization, while professional 
institutional investors . . . held only 18%.”). 
198 Comparing to the high percentage of civil actions following SEC enforcement actions in the 
U.S., even in the cases of CSRC-sanctioned companies with actual factual findings of wrongdoing, 
approximately 85% of such companies faced no civil actions by consumers from 2001 to 2006. See Cohn 
& Miao, supra note 197, at 358. From 2002 to 2011, securities civil actions “represent[ed] only about 
25.7% of all the eligible criminal/administrative sanctions . . . .” Robin Hui Huang, Private Enforcement 
of Securities Law in China, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 766 (2013). 
199 See Max Raskin & David Yermack, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the 
Future of Central Banking, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING 474 (Peter Conti-Brown 
& Rosa Lastra eds., 2018).     
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analysis. This Note attempts to explain that, compared to the U.S. approach, 
what stands behind China’s seemingly drastic crackdown was a 
government’s efforts to maintain existing regulatory consistency and 
conserve institutional resources. In such circumstances, China’s 
presumption of cryptocurrency as an evil Pandora’s Box at least nominally 
warns retailer investors, potentially mitigating crypto-mania.  
Though sympathetic, this Note argues that China’s approach in 
nominally banning cryptocurrencies has proven to be inefficient. 
Nevertheless, this Note also observes China’s state-initiated efforts in 
creating blockchain projects and potentially its own crypto-fiat. In contrast, 
the U.S. refrains from prescribing any premature judgment upon 
cryptocurrency as a whole. At the moment, the U.S. approach seems to 
strike a better balance between investor protection and financing 
technological development, presuming a functional, efficient capital 
market.  
This Note hopes that China will actively combat fraud and market abuse 
with or without reversing the 2017 ban. This Note strongly advises that the 
CSRC, perhaps with the aid of other regulatory agencies to properly enforce 
the commodities futures law. If the underlying technology were more 
mature, the Note would potentially propose a regulation-through-code 
approach, asking regulators of both countries to cooperate with industry 
members in an interactive process discussing how to translate the regulatory 
purposes into codes.200 While appearing theoretical, China’s state-led 
blockchain project might have already incorporated certain collaboration 
between regulation and coding to mitigate risks of anonymity in 
conventional public ledger.201 If the regulation-through-code approach was 
successful, it might promote further innovation and enable regulators to 
keep up with such advancement. Potentially, solving the riddle of how to 
                                                          
200 See supra note 178 and accompanying quote.  
201 See Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger 
Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 241 (2016) (stating that “[w]riting 
regulation into the code is not only possible, but is organic to the system. It is possible that an interaction 
between the decentralized ledger technology industry and regulators could be coordinated through a 
centralized entity representing the community, such as the Bitcoin Foundation, the Digital Asset 
Transfer Authority (DATA), or a similar organization created specifically for this purpose.”). 
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regulate the blockchain in this way will have far more significant impact 
than alleviating the immediate regulatory quagmire.  
 
Rain Xie* 
                                                          
 * Executive Articles Editor, Washington University Global Studies Law Review; J.D. 
Candidate (2019), Washington University School of Law; B.A. with honors (2014), majoring in 
Economics and College of Social Studies, Wesleyan University. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/9
